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International Executive Agreements:
Their Constitutionality, Scope
and Effect
Alfred P. Knoll
INTRODUCTION(1dN FEBRUARY 11, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
without the prior authorization of Congress or the subsequent
consent of the Senate, concluded an agreement with Marshal Joseph
Stalin and Sir Winston Churchill. It provided that in exchange for
an undertaking by Marshal Sta-
THE AUTHOR: ALFRED P. KNOLL lin, Russia would conclude a
(B.A., San Diego State College; J.D., pact of friendship with China
University of California, Hastings Col- and assist that country to ex-
lege of Law); Research Officer, British
Institute of International and Compara- tricate itself from Japanese
tive Law; Member, Max Planck Institute, control, and that for this fur-
Munich. ther undertaking, Russia would
enter the Pacific War two or
three months after Germany surrendered. The Prime Minister and
the President pledged their countries' support to allot to Russia the
Kuriles, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and adjacent islands;
to permit Russia to lease Port Arthur as a naval base; to interna-
tionalize the port of Dairen; and to permit Russia to operate the
Manchurian Railroad jointly with China. Where the interests of
China were affected by this agreement, President Roosevelt agreed
to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government. Such was the
Yalta Agreement.' When its terms became known, it precipitated
a controversy which continues to the present day and which gives
rise to the central thesis of this paper: first, "by what authority may
the President make internationally binding agreements without the
authorization of Congress or the consent of the Senate?"; and, sec-
ond, "what is the scope of the President's power when he acts with-
out such authorization and/or consent?".
The Constitution provides that the President "shall have the
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties .... "2 However, this has never been interpreted to mean
1Yalta Agreement, February 11, 1945, 59 Stat. 1823.
2 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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that a treaty is the only kind of agreement that the President may
make with a foreign government. It is only a permissive grant, for
it does not preclude the making of international agreements which
are not treaties, but which are equally binding in international law.8
Therefore, any study of the source and scope of the President's au-
thority to conclude such agreements, absent a clause in the Consti-
tution explicitly granting and limiting such authority, must be made
by determining the extent of his substantive powers in the field of
foreign affairs; the President's authority to make international
agreements without the consent of the Senate must be co-extensive
with these substantive powers and exist as a necessary concomitant
to their exercise. The most realistic gauge in this determination is
derived from the study of both historical precedents and case law,
the former carrying the greater burden as the problems posed in
this area have rarely reached the courts. Thus, for the most part,
both the source and the scope of the President's authority to conclude
international agreements is what common consensus has authorized
in the past.
The making of international agreements has constituted one of
the most important techniques to the general conduct of diplomacy
by which the Executive has sought to make the nation's foreign
policy effective. Its need is more than apparent; its abuse is more
than real. "The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution,
and their success must often depend on secrecy .... 1"4 Interference
by the Senate would many times diminish the effectiveness of the
President, as the nature of the transactions with foreign nations re-
quires expediency and unity of design.5  Other nations, either
through the vesting of authority in the Executive or by virtue of the
parliamentary system which insures the Executive of legislative sup-
port, have the power to act promptly." Thus, as the importance of
this country has grown internationally, the use of the executive
agreement has increased.
8 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1943).
4 1 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at
194 (1896).
5 COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 20 (1815) [1789-1824].
6See, U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, REGULATION OF TARIFF IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1934). In the 14-month period prior to the con-
sideration by Congress of the Trade Agreements Act, foreign countries had entered into
more than 60 bargaining agreements relating to customs treatment. Since that time
executive agreements have continued to be concluded in great numbers. See, Hearings
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 8430, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 361-62
(1934).
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"During the first fifty years of the government under the Con-
stitution, the President is known to have entered into some 27 in-
ternational acts without invoking the consent of the Senate, while
60 became law as treaties; for the second half of the century the
figures appear to be 238 executive agreements and 215 treaties;
and for the third similar period 917 executive agreements and 524
treaties."7
On hearings for the proposed Bricker Amendment before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Secretary of State Dulles stated that since 1928
there have been listed in the State Department Publications some
1527 executive agreements compared to 299 treaties.8
However, the scope, need, or effect of an agreement is not the
test of its constitutional validity. Yet no one has been able to give
a realistic explanation of its consitutional nature. That there should
be as yet no precise or even general limitations on the exercise of
such an important power is remarkable in a constitutional system
which professes limitations of power as its keystone. There is no
doubt that executve agreements possess the same vitality as do trea-
ties; they are thus the "supreme law of the land."9  It is therefore
conceivable that this power could be used to alter or destroy rights
guaranteed to our citizens by the Constitution without the safeguards
inherent in the treaty making process.. The proposed Convention
on Genocide," the proposed Convenant on Human Rights," and
the suggested adherence of the United States to the jurisdiction of
the proposed International Court of Criminal Justice,' 2 whereby
constitutionally guaranteed rights would have been altered by its
adoption, brought to light the potential misuse of the power of exe-
cutive agreements and prompted the introduction of the controver-
sial Bricker and other related amendments to the Constitution."
As noted above, the purposes of this article are two-fold: first,
to discuss the source of the President's power to make international
agreements without the consent of the Senate; and second, to en-
7 W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 4 (1941).
8 Statement of the Department of State before the Senate Judiciary Committee, an-
nexed to Department of State Press Release No. 174 at 9 (April 6, 1953); the publica-
tions referred to are the Executive Agreements Series (E.A.S.), Treaty Series (T.S.), and
Treaties and other International Acts Series (T.I.A.S.).
O See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
10 78 U.N.T.S. 278.
1127 DEPT. STATE BULL. 23 (1952).
12 7 U.N. GAOR, Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Supp. 11,
U.N. DoC. A/2136 (1952).
13 S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S.J. Res. 130 as amended, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952).
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deavor to determine the scope of this power. The former is
subdivided into the President's authority as derived from his inde-
pendent powers as President of the United States and that which is
delegated to him by congressional legislation. The latter topic is
analyzed from four points of view. These are: his power as limited
by affirmative grants of power in the Constitution; as limited by
treaty power; as limited by specific prohibitions in the Constitution;
and, as limited by the practical safeguards inherent in the political
process.
It might also be noted that the term "executive agreement" has a
variety of other titles such as treaty, convention, protocol, declara-
tion, agreement, covenant, statute, or charter. The choice of one
title over another often results from considerations that have no
legal significance. The title of an agreement between states does
not, therefore, determine whether it is an "international agreement."
The latter is defined as ". . . an agreement between states or inter-
national organizations by which there is a manifested intention to
create, change or define relationships under international law ....""
The relevancy of the title of any given instrument should merely be
used in determining whether it is the intention that the instrument
should have such effect.1 5
INDEPENDENT POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
The power of the President to conclude internationally binding
agreements presupposes a vital issue: that is, his power to act at
all in the field of foreign affairs. Congress has the power to regu-
late foreign commerce; to declare war; to provide, maintain and
regulate the armed forces; to exercise the taxing power in order to
provide for the common defense and general welfare; and to imple-
ment through the necessary and proper clause, all of the powers
possessed by the Federal Government. 6 Similarly, Article II, con-
fers upon the President several powers essential to the conduct of
foreign affairs: he is authorized to receive representatives from
foreign governments; 17 to make treaties with the advice and consent
14 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 115 (a) (1965).
15d. Comment to § 115 (a).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Other powers of less obvious utility have been frequently
employed in foreign affairs: for example, congressional power to establish post offices
has been used to conclude agreements regarding international regulation of the mails.
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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of two-thirds of the Senate;"8 he is Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy; 1  and he is, invested with executive power."
Finally, Article II, section 2, grants to the Senate the power to ap-
prove or disapprove all treaties submitted to it by the President.
Thus, when the question is asked, in whom does the Constitution
vest the authority to determine the foreign relations of the United
States, we are at once beset with confusion. Most would be inclined
to answer "in the President"; but they would be hard put, if chal-
lenged, to point out any definite statement to this effect in the Con-
stitution. One of the best known commentators has said:
"What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on
the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign rela-
tions, and certain other powers of the same general kind on the
Senate, and still other such powers on the Congress; but which of
these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining
the course 'of the American nation is left for events to resolve.[T]he Constitution, considered only for it affirmative grants of
power capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for
the privilege of directing American foreign policy." 21
However, the president's office has by a slow process of "aggran-
dizement" come to the point where it controls, for the most part, the
foreign affairs of the United States.22 Three relevant factors have
been the keynote of this process. First, the presidency has pos-
sessed from the beginning inherent practical advantages, which are
pointed out by Jay in The Federalist: unity of the office; its capac-
ity for secrecy and dispatch; and its superior sources of information.
A further advantage is that the President is always ready. to act, un-
like the legislature, which may be in recess or incapacitated by the
parlimentary complications of other business. 28  The second factor
is the Hamiltonian'conception of "executive power." This concept
- that the President possesses certain constitutional powers not
subject, to the will of Congress or the Senate - made its debut in a
series of debates between Hamilton and John Marshall as "Pacifius"
and "Helvidius" respectively. Hamilton's contention, one which has
prevailed, was briefly that the opening sentence of Article II is an
affirmative grant of power and not merely declaratory; that the
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
20 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
2 1 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 171 (4th ed. 1957).
22 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
23 A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (B. Wright ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited THE FEDERALIST].
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succeeding grants of power, except where coupled with specific re-
strictions or limitations, specify the principal articles implied in the
general grant and hence serve to interpret it; and finally, by infer-
ence, that the direction of foreign policy is inherently an "execu-
tive" function.24 The third factor is that the President is the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy and upon him rests the duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" - a part of which
is international law. As Corwin points out,
"From the first, therefore, it has devolved on him to protect Amer-
ican rights and to discharge American duties under the law of na-
tions; and, as commonly happens, the path of duty became in time
a road to power. The 'laws' to which the 'faithfully executed'
clause referred, . . . comprised not only the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties, but also those general laws of nations which govern
the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.
The United States, having become a member of the Society of Na-
tions, was obliged to respect the rights of other nations under that
code of laws, and the President, as the chief executive officer of the
laws and the agency charged with the superintendence of the na-
tion's foreign intercourse, was bound to rectify injury and preserve
peace."25
Thus by virtue of these three factors - the natural advantages of
the office, the broad grant and "inherent" powers of the President
as "Chief Executive," and the idea that the President is the "Con-
situtional Executor" of the laws-there is today no doubt that he
has exclusive power and is ". . . the sole organ of the Federal Gov-
ernment in the field of international relations. ' 2
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that the "Exec.
utive power shall be vested in the President .... " The President's
power to act as sole representative for the United States in foreign
affairs is necessarily attributable to the "Executive Power." How-
ever, nowhere in the Constitution can an explicit provision be found
which allows the President to conduct the foreign affairs of the
country by executive agreement without the authorization of Con-
gress or consent of the Senate. On the other hand, there is no doubt
that the Constitution recognizes that forms of international agree-
ments other than treaties exist. Article I, section 10, states that "No
State shall enter any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;" and that
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
24Supra note 21, at 179, citing WORKS.
25 Id. at 194, citing 1 OP. ATTY'. GEN. 566, 570 (1922).
2 6 Supra note 22.
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Power...." Since the power to make these agreements with con-
gressional consent was accorded to the states, it would be difficult to
conclude, in fact has never been concluded, that this power was
denied to the Federal Government.27 And, in order to prevent his
substantive powers from being in large measure ineffectual, the
President must share in this federal power. Thus, it can and has
been argued28 that the President's authority to make an agreement
which is binding internationally on the United States is so indispens-
able to his power to conduct foreign affairs of the country, that it
may be reasonably derived by implication from the language of Ar-
ticle I, section 10, of the Constitution.2  There may also be said to
reside in the Presidency an inherent power to make decisions in the
field of foreign affairs comparable to that possessed by the national
government as a whole.30 This is closely akin to the constitutional
theories of Taft,81 Roosevelt,8 2 and Locke,88 in supposing that the
President is limited only by specific restrictions contained in the
Constitution.
In light of the foregoing then, it would seem that the President
may use the device of an executive agreement wherever he is au-
thorized to act as the chief executive of the United States in foreign
affairs. In a sense, this may be said to be the ultimate authority
from which his power to make executive agreements arises.84 By
virtue of this constitutional provision the President has always been
recognized as the sole representative of the United States in conduct-
ing negotiations with other nations. In addition to controlling
27 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331 (1934); See also, McDougal & Lans,
Treaties and Congressional - Executive or Presidental Agreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 221 (1945).28 Supra note 9, at 330, where the Belmont Court notes, "The recognition, estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto,
were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the
two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment and agreements
and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may
not be doubted .... And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had author-
ity to speak as the sole organ of that government."
29 See, Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported
Potatoes, 67 HARv. L. REv. 281, 289 (1953).
8 0 REPORT ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 1.
31 W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIs POWERS 16 (1925).
82 "That the President is the 'steward' of the people and therefore has a duty to
carry out any action which the needs of the nation demand unless such action is specifi-
cally forbidden by the Constitution or laws of the United States," CORWIN, supra note
21, at 131.
83 "[A)ny act for the public good is authorized without any explicit provision
needed," J. LocKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOvERNMENT § 160 (1689).
84 HACKWORTH, supra note 3, at 402.
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negotiations, the President, as "Chief Executive," possesses a number
of other broad powers, some of which by their nature may not often
require implementation by international agreement. The "Chief
Executive" power affords a basis for the use of force to protect
American interest abroad." Employment of force has frequently
been in furtherance of general statements of United States policy
such as the Monroe Doctrine, which was promulgated under the au-
thority of the President as Chief Executive. This was the case when
Teddy Roosevelt, after being delayed by the Senate, seized the cus-
toms house in Santo Domingo to prevent its being taken over by
European creditors." Similarly, the Chief Executive power has been
invoked to authorize the President to settle claims held by private
citizens against other nations" and to grant commercial rights to
foreign businesses.
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . 3.8.8 By the above provision of the
Constitution there was conferred upon the President ". . . his most
formidable powers with respect to the external relations of the
United States."8  And although the fulfillment of the President's
powers as commander in chief in the field of foreign relations
doesn't necessarily require the use of executive agreements, such
agreements may be essential to the efficient execution of this duty
in appropriate circumstances. Therefore, the agreement making tech-
nique must be as available to the President for the discharge of this
obligation as for the implementation of his substantive powers.
The conflict here arises from the fact that Congress alone is em-
powered: "To declare War ...raise and support Armies ...pro-
vide and maintain a Navy .. .40 Thus it would seem that where
the President acts ostensibly as commander in chief and commits
American forces abroad or promises American military aid, he may
only do so under the authorization of Congress or pursuant to a
treaty.4 This question first arose in 1801 when American vessels
35 McDougal & Lans, supra note 27, at 250.
86 E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 39 (1944).
37 McDougal & Lans, supra note 27, at 249, 251.
8 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
39 W. MCCLURE, supra note 7, at 321.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 11, and 12.
41 It should be noted that the President is not limited in the use of force to the au-
thority which he possesses as commander in chief. As the initiator of American for-
eign policy, he often determines the interests of the United States which the Constitution
permits him to defend. Thus, the use of force to protect these interests is in effect
supported by his authority as Chief Executive.
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stationed in the Bay of Tripoli were attacked and Jefferson asserted
that until Congress had formally declared war, the ships had only
the internationally recognized right of self defense. Hamilton,
writing as "Lucius Crassus," heaped scorn on Jefferson's views and
held that the plain meaning of the Constitution was,
that it is the peculiar and exclusive province of Congress,
when the nation is at peace to change that state into a state of war;
whether from calculations of policy or provocation, or injuries re-
ceived, in other words it belongs to Congress only, to go to war.
But when a foreign nation declares war upon the U.S., they are
then by that very fact already at war, and any declaration on the
part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary." 42
This doctrine is also recognized in international law, that is, when
the action is in protection of rights of persons and property and is
not excessive, it is not an act of war of a legitimate cause, but a war-
like retort by the country suffering from it.48  Furthermore this view
has received the highest judicial sanction. Justice Nelson, writing
in Durand v. Hollins," said,
"As Executive head of the nation, the President is made the only
legitimate organ of the General Government, to open and carry on
correspondence or negotiations with foreign governments, in mat-
ters concerning the interests of the country or of its citizens. It is
to him, also, that citizens abroad must look for the protection of
person and property. . . For this purpose, the whole executive
power of the country is placed in his hands, under the Constitution,
and laws passed in pursuance thereof. . . [N]ow as respects the
interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of the lives
or property of the citizens, the duty must of necessity, rest on the
discretion of the President. Acts of lawlessness anticipated and
provided for; and the protection to be effectual or of any avail,
may, not infrequently, require the most prompt and decided ac-
tion." 4 5
In the Prize Cases40 the Supreme Court upheld the power of the
President to use force to defend the Union against Confederate at-
tack, despite the fact that Congress had made no formal declaration
of war. Consequently, over the course of time, the constitutional
responsibility for initiating and conducting military action has come
to rest on the President. Invocation of the term "war" has been
42 WoRKs 442-43 (A. Hamilton ed.)
43 See J. RODGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 92 (1945).
448 F. Cas. III (No. 4186) (S.D.N.Y. 1869).
451Id. at 112; See also, In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
46 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
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limited to a very few situations,47 while there have been numerous
instances of so-called "manuvers '"48 carried out under the constitu-
tional authority of the President alone.
Aside from the power to commit the American military abroad
and the use of the executive agreement as a necessary concomitant to
this power, the President's power as commander in chief has other
implications in the field of foreign affairs where agreement making
is often an essential and coextensive technique. The conclusion of
an agreement of peace is one way by which the exercise of military
force may be terminated and, as such, may be regarded as a natural
incident of the President's power as commander in chief. Aside
from its use in the past,"9 the Supreme Court, obiter dicta, has held
that war may be terminated by various methods, including "presi-
dential proclamation. "50 Other areas in which the device of inter-
national agreement has been used by the President under his com-
mander in chief powers have been: in regard to the control of
military equipment and resources; 5' -the conclusion of armistice agree-
ments with defeated enemies and regarding the administration of
liberated or conquered territories;52 and disposition of financial
claims of allied and hostile powers.'
The President's power to negotiate treaties arises out of para-
graph 2, section 2 of Article II, which reads "He shall have the
power to make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senators
present concur. . . ." Upon close and literal interpretation of the
above passage the apparent meaning is that the Senate, throughout
the entire process of treaty making, is associated with the President.
Jay also notes this in article #64 of the Federalist Papers, where
it is his thesis that the association of the President and Senate in
both negotiation and ratification holds true, but for one exception
- that being where the negotiation requires dispatch and great
secrecy. He concludes,
47 J. RODGERS, supra note 43, at 87.
48 96 CONG. REC. 9647 (1950) (Statement of Mr. Douglas); 111 CONG. REC_ 24903
(1965) (Memorandum of Law by Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward
Vietnam).
4 9 See C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 78-
79 (1951).
50 Ludecke v. Watkins 355 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1948).
5 1 BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 234.
6 2 Supra note 49, at 120-25.
5-3 Agreement with the United Kingdom respecting claims for damages resulting
from acts of armed forces personnel, March 28, 1944, 61 Star. 2728, T.I.A.S. No. 1602.
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"Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations
for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from
talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the
one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch on the other."54
However, the sad truth is that this magnanimous theory broke
down at its first test. Corwin notes a humorous incident:
"[T]he importance of which for American Institutions and for
the development of American foreign policy has rarely been ap-
preciated, is narrated from the point of view of the Senate by Sena-
tor William Maclay of Pennsylvania in his celebrated Journal:
'August 22d, Saturday (1789).- Senate met, and went on the
Coasting Bill. The door keeper soon told us of the arrival of
the President. The President was introduced, and took our
Vice-President's chair. He rose and told us bluntly that he
had called on us for our advice and consent to some proposi-
tions respecting the treaty to be held with the Southern In-
dians... Seven Heads. . .were stated at the end of the paper
which the Senate were to give their advice and consent to.
They were so framed that this could be done by aye or no.'
"It speedily transpired, however, that the Senate was not inclined
to stand and deliver forthwith, and presently Robert Morris also of
Pensylvania, rose and moved that the papers communicated by the
President be referred to a committee of five, a motion promptly
seconded by another member. To continue Maclay's narrative:
'Several members grumbled some objections. Mr. Butler
rose; made a lengthy speech against commitment; said we were
acting as a council. No council ever committed anything.
Committees were an improper mode of doing business; it
threw business out of the hands of the many into the hands
of the few, etc.
"Maclay himself now spoke at length in favor of commitment 'in
a low tone of voice.' 'Peevishness itself,' he asserts, 'could not have
taken offense at anything I said.' Nevertheless, he continues:
'[T]he President of the United States started up in a violent
fret. 'This defeats every purpose of my coming here,' were
the first words that he said. He then went on that he had
brought his Secretary of War with him to give every necessary
information; that the Secretary knew all about the business,
and yet he was delayed and could not go on with the matter.
"Maclay then adds his own interpretation of the event in these
words:
'I can not now be mistaken. The President wishes to tread
on the necks of the Senate.... Form only will be left to us.
This will not do with Americans. But let the matter work;
it will soon cure itself.'
This prophecy has been amply verified by history. [N]o Presi-
dent. . .has since that day ever darkened the doors of the Senate
for the purpose of personal consultation with it concerning the
advisability of a desired negotiation."'55
54 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 23, at 423.
55 Supra note 21, at 209-10.
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Thus, from the very beginning, despite the constitutional provi-
sions and intent to the contrary notwithstanding, the Senate's role
in treaty making was put at that of merely a legislative chamber.
Its power consists of a veto, and its role is only that of saying whether
a treaty shall be ratified.
This historical incident was given judicial recognition in 1936,
when the Supreme Court held that:
"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, deli-
cate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as the representative of the nation. He makes trea-
ties with the advice andconsent of the Senate; but he alone nego-
tiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude;
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.''58
Thus, by the very treaty clause of the Constitution, the President
is necessarily invested with the power to act without the consent of
the Senate, to conduct negotiations and, where necessary, conclude
agreements which the exigencies of the situation may call for.
Although this widely used power of the President has been the
basis of relatively few executive agreements, it has provided the
President with the authority for some of the most important exer-
cises of his power to make international agreements. Due to the
fact that there is "an immense latent authority in his power of rec-
ognition, 51 7 the President may, at his discretion, recognize or sever
relations with a foreign power.5 And the President has established
himself as the exclusive medium through which all communication
addressed by the outside world to the United States is directed.59
Thus if the President is not to be stymied in the exercise of this
power in the many contexts noted, it must by implication include
the power to make international agreements.
This argument was recognized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Pink, ° which centered around the controversial Litvinov
Agreement. 1 The Agreement was an assignment of certain Rus-
sian claims against American nationals in return for American rec-
56Supra note 22, at 319.
57 H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 174-75 (1940).
58 "In every case, as it appears, of a new government and of belligerency, the ques-
tion of recognition was determined solely by the President." J. MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 243-44 (1906); see also, United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610 (1818).
5 9 See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 72
(1917).
60 Supra note 9.
61 For a series of notes culminating on November 16, 1933 in the Litvinov Agree-
ment, see 28 AM. J. INT'L L SUPPL. 1-11 (1934).
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ognition of the Soviet Union. The trial court held the agreement
invalid on the grounds that it contravened local and state laws and
therefore was beyond the competence of the presidency to so act
without the consent of the Senate. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the agreement made by the President under his exclusive
power to grant diplomatic recognition to foreign states was valid
without the consent of the Senate and could be made without re-
gard to state law or policy.
The constitutional obligation imposed upon the President to see
that ". . . He shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed
S. .,2 provides another basis for independent executive action in
the sphere of foreign relations. Writing in 1890, Justice Miller
put the question with regard to the President's duty to "take care
that the laws are faithfully executed:"
"Is this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of
treaties of the United States according to their express terms, or
does it include the rights, duties and obligations growing out of
the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the pro-
tection implied by the nature of the government under the Consti-
tution?"63
The answer is obviously in the affirmative, as "Pacifius" had writ-
ten nearly 30 years before. 64  Not only does the President's obliga-
tion to execute the laws extend to the laws of nations and interna-
tional agreements, but "incident to the power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed [the President] has power to enter into
agreements with foreign countries necessary to their enforcement." 5
It follows then, that because treaties are considered the "supreme
law of the land,"66 the President may enforce the provision of trea-
ties under the same constitutional authority." Several of the in-
stances noted before, pertaining to the use of force abroad under the
President's power as commander in chief, might be equally justified
under this constitutional provision. 68 Justice Sutherland extended
this even further. He held that where the President makes an exec-
utive agreement it is as binding as a treaty despite the argument that
a strict construction of the supremacy clause ostensibly holds only
62 Supra note 17.
6 3 Supra note 45, at 64.
6 4 Supra note 21, at 179.
65 Hearings on S. J. Res. I and 43 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on
the judiciary, 83 Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1953).
6 6 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
67 Supra note 7, at 316-17.
68 Supra note 21, at 194-200.
[Vol. 2: 94
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
treaties as "laws. ' 69 The net result, if not on rather tenuous grounds,
is that by equating treaties with executive agreements on a consti-
tutional basis the President is obligated to execute the latter as part
of the "law of the land" and is provided with still another basis for
independent executive action in foreign affairs.
POWER TO MAKE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
PURSUANT TO CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
Thus far our discussion has been limited to the power of the
President to conclude executive agreements solely on the basis of
the constitutionally delegated authority vested in him by virtue of
the fact that he is the President of the United States. Another
equally pertinent source of authority to conclude international agree-
ments is that of congressional legislation that so empowers him to
act.
It is no doubt today a truism that Congress is invested with sole
legislative power in the United States,7" that the scope of this legis-
lation is governed by the enumerated powers expressly conferred by
Article I, section 8, and those implied under the necessary and proper
clause of subsection 18, section 8 of Article . ' Thus, where Con-
gress has delegated to the President power to make internationally
binding agreements without the subsequent consent of the Senate,
two vital issues are presented: first, is the legislation that which is
within the competence of Congress to enact; and, second, may Con-
gress constitutionally delegate this power to the President?
Most of the litigation in this area stems from legislation by Con-
gress under its power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations. '7 2
The constitutionality of the McKinley Tariff Act of 18907" was at-
tacked on the ground that in authorizing the President to suspend
free importation of certain products the Congress had delegated
to him both legislative and treaty-making powers. Under the au-
thority of this legislation some twelve executive 'agreements were
concluded binding the United States to admit, free of duty, articles
coming from other agreeing countries. However, in Field v. Clark,
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, upheld the validity of the
legislation and the agreements made in pursuance thereof. He said,
69 United States v. Belmont, supra note 9.
70 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
71McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
7 8Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
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"That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President
is a principle universally recognized. . . . The Act of October 1,
1890, in the particular consideration is not inconsistent with that
principle. It does not, in any real sense, invest the President with
the power of legislation. ... [Wjhat has been said is equally
applicable to the objection that the third section of the act invests
the President with treaty-making power."74
In the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, 7 5 Congress au-
thorized the President to conclude reciprocal trade agreements with
other governments, and further allowed the President to modify
existing tariff rates, when "in his opinion" a country was "discrimi-
nating in fact against the commerce of the United States, directly
or indirectly." Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in Hampton and Company
v. United States, upheld its constitutionality and laid down the prin-
ciple that has become the test: "If Congress shall lay down by leg-
islative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body au-
thorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.'"'" The
thrust of the above opinion and its subsequent adherence by the
courts and Congress is that Congress may constitutionally delegate
to the President power to make executive agreements, provided Con-
gress so limits the scope of the President's authority by an intelli-
gible principle.
In more recent times, as the influence and involvement of the
United States has grown internationally, the scope of permissable
powers that may be delegated has also broadened. The landmark
case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. held that, in providing
for the carrying out of legislation affecting the foreign relations of
the United States, Congress may constitutionally vest in the President
far greater discretion than would be normally permissible in the
case of enactments which relate solely to domestic matters. The
court declared:
"Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contain
one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing ac-
tion by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign rela-
tions, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unre-
stricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than
that which has always been considered requisite with regard to
domestic affairs.' '7
74 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692, 694 (1890).
75 Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858.
76 Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
7 Supra note 22, at 324.
[Vol. 2: 94
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
The Court finally concluded that:
"The uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice
just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution
which, even if the practice found far less support in principle
than we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at this late day
to disturb it."78
What this line of precedents establishes is that if the subject
matter legislated upon is within the scope of the powers of Congress,
they may authorize the President constitutionally to deal with it by
executive agreement, the treaty making power to the contrary not
withstanding. 79
SCOPE OF INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
From the foregoing it is apparent that the President does possess
the power to make internationally binding agreements without the
consent of the Senate. However, this statement ignores the essen-
tial question, which is not whether the President can constitution-
ally enter into executive agreements, a point universally conceeded,
but what is the scope that these agreements may validly take?
It should be pointed out that the President has the "power"80 to
bind this country internationally in matters over which he may have
no constitutional authority. s1 It is the position of most countries,
including the United States, that the rule announced by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is binding and may be relied on by another
country in making an agreement with the United States. The court
held that, ". . . where there exists a conflict between state and-treaty
law, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own constitu-
tion with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
International Law or treaties in force. '82  It is of no concern what
another nation must go through in order to give effect to an agree-
ment or legalize it under its own constitution. However, it does not
follow that because the President has the "power" to bind the United
States internationally that a priori he possesses the "right" or that if
is constitutional for him to do so. This position has been argued
78 Id. at 329; see also, South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States,
334 F.2d 622 (1964).
7 9 Sup 'a note 21, at 213-14.
8 0 See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS (1919).
8 1 Supra note 3, at 156.
82Advisory opinion on the Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, [1932)
P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 44.
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from the broad dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318 (1936), ". . . the investment of the federal govern-
ment with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution."
Ostensibly it would seem that the scope of the constitutional
right of the President to conclude internationally binding agree-
ments is limited by the grants of executive power in Article II of
the Constitution or where he acts pursuant to a valid delegation of
power from Congress. This is the position of the Restatement of
United States Foreign Relations Law, section 121. This position is
supported by no authority.8" It is also unsound in light of past usage
and holdings by the Supreme Court where the President has con-
cluded agreements that have neither been pursuant to a congressional
grant of power nor within his independent executive powers.84
The inference is that the President may make any international
agreement that is not expressly prohibited or expressly reserved to
Congress (i.e., to declare war, regulate foreign commerce, etc.) un-
der the Constitution.
It would seem that all international agreements are limited in
scope by the guarantees of private rights in the Constitution. Al-
though the First Amendment is by its terms limited only to Congress,
it has been interpreted to apply to all of the other branches of the
Federal Government including the President.85 The applicability of
the First Amendment to all other branches of the Government is
confirmed by the Fifth Amendment:
"Read literally, the First Amendment of the Constitution forbids
only 'Congress' to abridge these freedoms. But as the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the prohibition to all
state action, the due process clause of the Fifth must extend to all
Federal Action." 86
In Seery v. United States it was held that an executive agreement
could not supersede the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
plaintiff under the Fifth Amendment. There the President had
made an agreement with the Austrian Government whereby they
would settle all claims against the United States for damages result-
83 Supra note 14, at 12.
84 In 1941 the President undertook to defend Iceland without expense to the latter
and promised compensation for damages occasioned by the military activities of the
U.S. See Agreement with Iceland respecting defense, July 1, 1941, 55 Stat. 1547,
E.A.S. No. 232.
85 Hearings, supra note 65, at 247.
86 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 87 (D.C. Cir;. 1949)
(dissenting opinion).
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ing from the American occupation. An American whose property
had been "taken" by the United States forces brought suit to recover
damages in the United States and not in the Austrian Court. The
defense of the United States, that the rights of Mrs. Seery were gov-
erned by the agreement and not the Constitution, was overturned.
The court concluded that:
"Whatever may be the doctrine as to treaties that conflict with the
express provisions of the Constitution, it does not hold that an
executive agreement can impair the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff to just compensation for property taken by the United
States."87
And in Best v,. United States, a federal court of appeals held that
an executive agreement could not abridge the rights of American
citizens in Austria to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 8
Moreover, it would seem that the President is limited in the use
of the agreement device in areas that are expressly reserved to Con-
gress in Article I, section 8. To what extent is left for events to
determine! The power to declare war is exclusively within the prov-
ince of Congress. However, the controversy evoked by American
participation in Korea and Viet-Nam illustrates the confusion and
possible perils resulting from the use of the out-moded concept of
what constitutes "war." Both actions would seem to be justified
under the United Nations Charter and the S.E.A.T.O. treaties. Sec-
retary of State Dulles recognized that the power of the President to
take military action can be broadened by the ratification of a treaty;
he stated that "one result of the North Atlantic Treaty is to enlarge
somewhat the area within which the President can make war, as
against the so-called declaration of war.""9 Congress also possesses
the exclusive power to support and regulate the armed forces"0
and thus can control the size of the military by appropriations. The
President may exhort, but cannot control the Congress, except that
he may force the legislature to meet his demands by committing the
armed forces to action under his independent authority."' Article I,
section 8, also empowers Congress to "regulate commerce with for-
eign nations." This section would seem to be unequivocal in hold-
87 Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
8 8 Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950).
89 Hearings, supra note 65, at 62, 887.
90 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
91 "Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether;
but so long as we have a military force, Congress cannot take away from the President
the supreme command." Swain v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), alf'd, 165
U.S. 553 (1897).
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ing that Congress possesses "all" power to regulate foreign commerce.
However, a shadow of doubt has now crossed on the foregoing
statement in light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Guy W. Capps, Inc.92  The case involved an executive agreement
with Canada respecting the importation of certain types of potatoes.9"
Not only did the agreement encompass the regulation of commerce,
it also contravened a prior act of Congress dealing with the same
subject matter. 4 In a suit by the United States for breach of the
agreement, the Fourth Circuit held the agreement invalid on the
grounds that it was not within the consititutional powers of the
President to regulate commerce. The court said, "The Power to
regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not in the execu-
tive or the courts; and the executive may not exercise the power by
entering into executive agreements .... .. However, on appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held simply that the agreement
was not breached and did not pass on the question of the constitu-
tionality of the agreement.9 6 The conclusion is that the President
does possess some plenary powers in the field of foreign commerce.
As noted in the above, Congress may validly delegate its reserved
powers to the President and the scope of delegable powers may be
very broad . 7  The ultimate question then becomes whether the de-
vice of executive agreement can be used interchangeably with the
treaty power as an instrument of foreign policy, or does it act as a
limitation upon it? It has been forcefully argued that presidential
agreements are to some degree more limited in scope than treaties or
congressional-executive agreements.9 8 However, there have also been
assertions that the two are completely interchangeable, and that the
executive agreement is the preferable of the two.9  But whatever
the sentiments are on this issue, the Supreme Court has never held an
92 348 U.S. 297, 75 S. Ct. 326 (1955).
93 Agreement with Canada, November 23, 1948, 62 Star. 3717, T.I.A.S. No. 1896.
94 Agriculture Act of 1948, Ch. 827, 62, Star. 1247 (codified in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.).
9 5 United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d. 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953).
96 United States v. Guy W. Capps, supra note 92.
9 7 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
98 "We do not think that executive agreements should ever rise or were ever in-
tended to rise to the dignity of treaties,... there is a legitimate area for executive agree-
ments, but executive agreements should not be used to by-pass the treaty powers .. -"
Hearings on S. J. Res. 130 before a subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong. 2d Sess. 44 (1952); cf. H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 177 (1940);
Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement by the United States,
31 PROC. AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L. 45, 52, (1937).
99 See McDougal & Lans, supra note 27; and W. MCCLURE, supra note 7.
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executive agreement unconstitutional on the grounds that it usurped
the treaty making function of the Senate. Therefore, we are with-
out any clear guidelines as to its outer limits. In hearings before the
House Judiciary Committee on the proposed Bricker Amendment,
Secretary of State Dulles summed up the difficulty involved. He
said:
"[I]t has been long recognized that difficulties exist in the deter-
mination as to which international agreements should be submitted
to the Senate as treaties, which ones should be submitted to both
Houses of Congress, and which ones do not require any congres-
sional approval.... [I]t would be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to fit all agreements into set categories. . . . [T]he
executive cannot surrender the freedom of action necessary for its
operations in the field of foreign affairs."'100
Whether the President chooses to submit an agreement to the Senate
for its approval, has little, if any, effect on the binding nature of the
agreement internationally. In terms of the domestic effect of the
international agreement upon the United States, however, there may
be a substantial difference. Treaties are the "Supreme Law of the
Land" under the Constitution. In addition, it is clear that accord-
ing to what the Court held in Missouri v. Holland,1 1 a treaty can
have the effect of authorizing congressional action otherwise im-
possible. Whether the same is true of executive agreements is open
to speculation; 10 2 there have been very few cases which considered
the question of whether an executive agreement is a treaty within
the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. However, in light of the
broad dicta in United States v. Belmont' and United States v.
Pink10 4 dealing with the validity of the Litvinov Agreement, it would
seem that an executive agreement is fully within the meaning of a
treaty under the Supremacy Clause. In Belmont the Court implied
that the executive agreement made by the President alone, under his
exclusive power to grant diplomatic recognition to foreign states,
was valid without the consent of the Senate and that the external
powers of the United States were to be exercised without regard to
100 Note 65 supra, at 65.
101 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
102 It is probably also true in the case of the executive agreement, for the necessary
and proper clause gives Congress the power "[T)o make all laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into execution the ... Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof."
[emphasis by the author] U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18.
103 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
104315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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state laws or policies.'0 5 In the Pink case, the Court held unequiv-
ocally that state policy must yield to the federal policy announced in
the executive agreement. The Supreme Court overruled the holding
of the state court that state law and property rights thereunder could
not be altered by the agreement with the Soviet Government. The
Court said, "[Al treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the Supremacy
Clause . . . of the Constitution. Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity."'06
In Etlimar Societe Anonyme v. United States,'0' the Court of Claims
held that an executive agreement will prevail over a federal statute.
The Court in this case was concerned with the Byrnes-Blum Agree-
ment under which all claims against the United States arising from
the Moroccan campaign were to be submitted to a French commis-
sion and paid by the French Government. On the dismissal of his
claim by the United States, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Claims. The Court dismissed his plea holding, "fT]he Byrnes-Blum
Agreement between the United States and France is the type of agree-
ment which has been recognized as a treaty within the meaning of
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution and thus is a part of 'the
Supreme Law of the Land.' "lo8
The President has also terminated prior treaties by executive
agreement and this right has been, by implication, recognized by
the Court. Charlton v. Kelly'09 held that since the Executive De-
partment had elected to waive any right to free itself from the obli-
gations of the treaty, the Court was bound to recognize the obliga-
tion.
Another assumption that executive agreements are not equal in
status to treaties rests upon the misconceived theory that executive
agreements last only as long as the administration that concluded
them."' Although it is true that the substance of many executive
agreements is of a temporary nature, this does not mean that an
agreement cannot be, and has not been, of longer duration. The
Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the Gentlemen's Agreement with Ja-
pan are two of the better known examples of long-term presidential
agreements. Moreover, the actual effect of an executive agreement
'O5 Supra note 103, at 330.
106 Supra note 104, at 230.
107 106 F. Supp. 191 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
108 Id. at 195.
109 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
110 See Hearings, supra note 98, at 439.
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on the foreign policy of the United States may be as extensive as if
it had been a treaty. For example, the Fifty Destroyer Deal, al-
though its immediate effect was accomplished with the end of the
fighting of World War II, has nevertheless created a lasting relation-
ship between the United States and Great Britain in the form of a
regional defense alliance that has outlived the War and is still with
us today, as the leases for the bases and facilities are for 99 years." 1
Thus, as can be readily deduced from the above, the legal con-
sequences, the international effect, the domestic ramifications, and
the duration of treaties and executive agreements are substantially
the same. There seems to be nothing inherent in the treaty making
power that limits the President's scope or authority to make inter-
national agreements without the consent of the Senate.
Despite the fact that there seems to be no constitutional bar to
the making of international agreements by the President, instead of
submitting them to the Senate for their ratification in the form of
treaties, and despite the fact that the two are used interchangeably,
many writers and statesmen feel that there ought to be such a dichot-
omy.
Attorney General Jackson felt that no executive agreement should
be concluded by the President if it required the exercise of congres-
sional powers for its fulfillment,"' However, this test has been
criticized as being much too broad, since most executive agreements
require at least funds appropriated through congressional action for
its purposes to be carried out."'
Equally ideal and unrealistic is the suggestion that executive
agreements should encompass only "adjudicative" matters, while all
"legislative" matters should be left to treaties or congressional ac-
tion."" However, any attempt to define and delineate what is "ad-
judicative" and what is "legislative" would result in hopeless confu-
sion and would rob the President of his power in a number of areas
where the constitutional basis of such power is scarcely open to ques-
tion.
The most common theory put forth is that executive agreements
should only be used to conduct the day-to-day operations of the Ex-
111 Naval and Air Bases Agreement with Great Britain, (September 2, 1940), 54
STAT. 2405, E.A.S. No. 181. Subsequently the two countries entered into supplemen-
tary agreements with respect to the status of Newfoundland.
112 See 39 OP. ATrrY. GEN. 484 (1940).
113 Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1954).
114 Id.
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ecutive Department and entail only "unimportant" matters.115 How-
ever, this seems to obscure the issue and invite quibbling over what
is and what is not "important." As noted above, the President is
charged with being the sole organ of foreign affairs for the United
States. Thus, to reduce him to being concerned with matters of
little importance would be to deny him his constitutionally invested
rights as well as his status in the field of international affairs.
At this point the reader might be convinced, and justifiably so,
that there is no real limit to the scope of the President's authority to
make international agreements. However, it should be kept in mind
that the President must function within the framework of a political
structure that limits power by practical safeguards as well as con-
stitutional divisions of power. It may be recalled that Congress has
the power to limit the effectiveness of presidential agreements in
areas in which its own powers of legislation do not extend. The
Senate can refuse the necessary appropriations or implementing leg-
islation. They may limit the size and disposition of the armed forces,
with the effect of inhibiting the President's power to take military
action." 6 Although an agreement may bind the United States in-
ternationally, Congress can nullify any domestic effect by passing
legislation to that effect if the subject matter is within their legisla-
tive power.'
The validity of presidential agreements is reviewable by the courts
and to date no agreement by the President has been held unconsti-
tutional. This can be cause for confidence as well as concern and
must be construed in light of the practices and attitudes of the Su-
preme Court. Decisions which raise the question of the President's
authority to execute international agreements are rare, largely be-
cause of the procedural difficulties in raising the constitutional
issue." 8  Very few international executive agreements have a suffi-
cient domestic effect (e.g., the Litvinov Agreement) to qualify a
petitioner's raising the constitutional issue that he has suffered or
may suffer a direct impairment of his own constitutional rights as
a result of the agreement." 9 To the procedural difficulties must be
115 Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
751 (1939).
116 RODGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1940).
117 There is substantial authority to support the view that where an act of Con-
gress and a treaty conflict, the one latest in time prevails. The leading case is Sanchez
v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889); and the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
118 Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
119 Tyler v. Judges, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
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added certain presumptions indulged in by the courts when dealing
with acts of the President, such as the following: When the Presi-
dent acts he is presumed to do so within the scope of his constitu-
tional authority;121 when the President makes a determination that
an emergency exists and takes action based on this determination,
it is assumed that his determination is not open to judicial review;12 '
and, that the President cannot be enjoined from acting in his capac-
ity as President of the United States. 22 Further, it must be kept in
mind that should the Supreme Court hold a presidential agreement
unconstitutional, it may be virtually impossible to enforce such a
decision. 2' Therefore, the courts are reluctant to review such is-
sues.1
24
In addition to the various legal controls possessed by Congress
and the power of review exercised by the courts, purely practical
considerations are customarily effective in limiting the President's
power to formulate the foreign policy of the United States in dis-
regard of Congress. The Senate possesses incidental control over
the activities of the President by virtue of its power to refuse con-
sent to the appointment of various important subordinates. And
no President who expects to see his programs carried into effect
can ignore the wishes and the sensitivities of the legislature. To
these indirect political limitations of Congress must be added the
power of public opinion and the ballot box. These two have proved
the most effective in the past and will probably continue to serve us
adequately in the future.
CONCLUSION
It is often said that our Constitution, by its system of legal checks
and balances on discretionary powers given to our officials, ensures
a government of laws and not of men. The power to conduct our
foreign affairs is unusual because of the absence of any express
limitations on presidential discretion. The conclusion from the fore-
going is inescapable: The President's scope in making executive
agreements is not governed by any express grants of executive power
120 United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926).
1 2 1 The Oronu, 18 F. Cas. 830, (No. 10,585) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
122 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
128 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
124 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (The Court
held unconstitutional an executive order by President Lincoln in which he suspended
a writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln ignored the decision and the defendant was subse-
quently tried by a military tribunal.)
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in the Constitution. Nor is it limited by the treaty making power of
the Senate. For as long as the President does not abrogate any ex-
pressly guaranteed rights of the Constitution he may act at his dis-
cretion in the field of foreign affairs." 5
The possibility of a presidential coup d'etat or abuse of this dis-
cretion stemming from the rapid expansion of the executive power
under the Roosevelt administration, gave impetus to the contro-
versial Bricker Amendment designed to check any presidential ex-
pansion of this power in conducting foreign affairs. 12 6  The effect
of the Amendment would have been to transfer to the legislative
branch of the government a large share of the responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs and to prohibit the President's making any
international executive agreements that had any internal effect on
the country without subsequent legislation by Congress. The
Amendment was submitted twice to Congress and both times failed.
The reasons for its failure, however, rested not upon the lack of de-
sire of Congress to limit and define the scope of the President's au-
thority and therefore prevent abuse of this power. Rather, its failure
rested upon the inability to draft an amendment that would elimi-
nate the risk of abuse and still give the President enough power to
carry out his executive duties. Senator Bricker admitted that he
could not draw the line. 2 7
Few would object to constitutional limitations which would pre-
vent abuse of presidential power without eliminating that power
itself. The very subject matter of the power bespeaks of the dif-
125 The best statement by the Supreme Court to this effect appeared in Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). The Court there spoke in terms of the limits on the
treaty making power which by implication applies to executive agreements under the
rulings in the Belmont and the Pink cases. The Court said that a treaty could not exer-
cise a power which was expressly excepted from those granted to the Federal Govern-
ment, or reorganize the political xelationships of the government, or cede any portion
of any state to a foreign power without the consent of the State.
126 After extensive maneuvering, the following version of the Bricker Amendment
was voted upon in the Senate:
"1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts
with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
2. An international agreement other than a treaty shall become effective as
internal law in the United States only by act of Congress.
3. On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty
the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting
for and against shall be entered on the Journal of the Senate.
4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States with 7 years from the date of its submission."
The resolution failed by one vote - 60 for the resolution, 31 against, and 5 absten-
tions. 100 CONG. REC. 2358, 2374 (1954).
127 98 CONG. REC. 907 (1952).
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ficulty of saying what those limitations should be. Our foreign re-
lations are an essential aspect of this country's politics and there is
no question but that the executive agreement is an extremely im-
portant instrument in the conduct of our foreign relations. Our
present preeminence in world affairs promises to make the execu-
tive agreement even more important. No one has been able to give
an exact exposition of its constitutional nature; nor can anyone say
with certainty what things the President alone or the President and
Congress together may do with an executive agreement and what
they may not do. It is true that the effects of executive agreements
are often legal as well as political and that where there is power to
make law there should be legal limitations on that power. But in
the past the most effective checks on presidential abuse of discretion
in this field have been political, not legal.
Any meaningful answer to the quest for a delineation of the
scope of the President's power to conclude internationally binding
agreements has not been, and very probably cannot be, formulated
in terms of constitutional doctrine. It must be based, rather, on a
realistic appraisal of this country's needs in the domain of interna-
tional relations. In this sense it is not incompatible with constitu-
tional principles for the President to be accorded a broad degree of
discretion over foreign affairs. He is in a better position to act
more expediently than Congress, whose members are elected on the
basis of their competence and knowledge of local issues. An isola-
tionist may be chagrined at this statement, but we are not living in an
isolationist world.
1970]
